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I. Introduction
This article provides a practical overview of how to comply with
the United States export licensing system in the computer field. It
does not attempt to discuss every detail of the voluminous pages of
ever-changing regulations. Neither does it fully discuss the signifi-
cant policy issues in this area now being debated among various con-
gressional, administrative, and private factions. These limits are
particularly necessary because the exact policy and legal framework
of export controls that will be in place at the time of publication is
uncertain.
Two sets of fundamental competing policy interests lie at the
heart of the debate on most 6f the policy issues in this area and en-
sure the continuation of debate over the appropriate level and
method of export controls. On the one hand, free enterprise and
free speech provide the foundation for unfettered exports of goods
and technology. On the other hand, national security and foreign
policy concerns call for certain restrictions on United States exports.
The issue of the appropriate balance between the two sets of com-
peting policies is the dilemma underlying the debates over a number
of export control issues: which agency should have regulatory
power-Commerce or Defense; which agency should have enforce-
ment power-Commerce or Customs; whether existing contracts
should be sanctified when new controls are imposed; to what extent,
if any, should there be judicial review of export control decisions;
and what kind of exports should be controlled to which countries.
Perhaps nowhere is the effect of this balancing dilemma more
clearly realized than in the computer area. The result is a complex,
rapidly changing set of regulations that requires interpretation by a
combination of lawyers, engineers, and businesspersons. Thus, any
definitive examination of the current technical and policy issues will
be stale before it is published. Nevertheless, the competing policies
also assure that much of the basic regulatory structure will continue
to exist in some form or another. Therefore, this article explores the
practical and legal aspects of United States export controls and pro-
vides suggestions for establishing export control compliance
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programs.1
II. Overview of the Export Control Framework
A. All Exports Require a License
Often when a client has a new product or technology to export,
the first question is "Does it need an export license?" This question
is more correctly phrased as "Do I have to apply for a license," or
"What kind of license do I need?" With a few minor exceptions, 2 all
exports and re-exports of U.S. goods and technology require a
license.
Certain licenses require prior application and approval by the
appropriate U.S. agency ("Validated Licenses"). 3 Others generally
require only self-adherence to regulations ("General Licenses"). 4
Both types of licenses, however, require adherence to other export
control regulations, including documentation and recordkeeping re-
quirements. Also, a product that may be exported under a General
License to one destination may require a Validated License for ex-
port to another destination, for reasons not readily apparent. The
perspective that all exports require an export license thus will assist
in complying with export control requirements.
B. Two Principal Sets of Export Controls for Computers
1. Export Administration Regulations
The primary U.S. export licensing regulations for computers are
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). 5 They are adminis-
tered principally by the Office of Export Administration (OEA) in the
International Trade Administration of the Commerce Department.
Unless an export is specifically governed solely by other licensing
requirements, it is under the jurisdiction of the EAR.6 This article
I For a broader article on export controls, see Sloniewsky, The Export Administration
Regulations-Licensing Requirements, in 2 THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON IMPORT
ADMINISTRATION AND EXPORT ADMINISTRATION 1984 129 (P.L.I. Corp. L. & Prac. Hand-
book Ser. No. 456, 1984) [hereinafter cited as THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS]. See
generally Boyd & Whisman, The U.S. Law of Export Controls: A Selected Bibliography, 18 INT'L
LAw. 483 (1984) (articles cited therein).
2 For exports to Canada, the general policy is that neither a validated nor a general
license is required. 15 C.F.R. § 385.6 (1984). Commodities transiting through Canada
and intended for re-export to a third country and certain nuclear-related commodities and
technical data exported to Canada, however, require a license. Id. §§ 379.4(c), (e), 378.4
(1984).
S See infra text accompanying notes 123-37.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 112-22.
5 15 C.F.R. §§ 369-399 (1984) [hereinafter cited as EAR]. The EAR is published by
OEA each fiscal year as a looseleaf set, and it is supplemented by periodic Export Adminis-
tration Bulletins containing amendments to the EAR, as published in the Federal Register.
EAR § 369 contains the Commerce Department's "antiboycott regulations," which
are not discussed in this article.
6 See EAR § 370.10 (1984). Other export controls covering specific areas include the
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thus focuses on the EAR.
The principal legislative authority for the EAR has been the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1979. 7 In the midst of protracted dis-
agreements over the type of legislation that should be enacted to
amend the Act, however, Congress allowed it to expire, and on
March 30, 1984, the President invoked the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act8 to maintain the EAR in place. 9 Although in
the past, presidents have extended the EAR when its enabling statute
has lapsed, such lengthy administrative extension of a complex set of
regulations under broad statutory authority raises issues that are be-
yond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that at
least one district court has held that judicial review of an export li-
censing decision was not precluded under administratively extended
regulations, as it would have been under the Export Administration
Act of 1979.10 Other challenges to attempted denials of the protec-
tion of the Administrative Procedure Act I may be expected. A more
fundamental question is the scope of administrative discretion if
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 12-18, and
those export controls covering: nuclear reactor vessels and related commodities, 10
C.F.R. § 110 (1984) (administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); commodities
and technical data related to production of special nuclear material, 10 C.F.R. § 810
(1984) (administered by the Department of Energy); natural gas, electric power, and re-
lated facilities, 10 C.F.R. §§ 305, 320 (1984); 18 C.F.R. § 153.1 (1984) (Department of
Energy); narcotics and dangerous drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 1321.21 (1984) (Drug Enforcement
Agency, Department ofJustice); certain U.S.-flag watercraft, 46 C.F.R. § 221 (1984) (U.S.
Maritime Administration, Department of Transportation), see also EAR § 370.10(0) (1984)
(export of watercraft) (OEA); endangered fish and wildlife, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17, 222 (1984)
(Department of Interior, National Marine Fisheries Service); tobacco seed and certain to-
bacco plants, 7 C.F.R. § 34.3 (1984) (Department of Agriculture); technical data for filing
patent applications, 37 C.F.R. § 5 (1984) (Patent and Trademark Office); EAR § 379.3(c)
(1984) (patent applications under a General License GTDA).
Certain regulations administered by the Treasury Department should also be con-V,
suited regarding exports from non-U.S. countries to certain destinations by the U.S. citi-
zens or affiliates of U.S. companies. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
§ 500; Transaction Control Regulations, id. § 505, Cuban Assets Control Regulations, id.
§ 515, Iranian Assets Control Regulations, id. § 535.
7 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979), amended by Export Administration Amend-
ments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-145, 95 Stat. 1727 (1981) (formerly codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2401-2420 (1982)) (expired Mar. 30, 1984) [hereinafter cited as EAA of
1979].
For a review of legislation up to enactment of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
see Note, An Overview of Export Controls on Transfer of Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of Soviet
Intervention in Afghanistan, 5 N.C.J. INrr'L L. & COM. REG. 555, 559-66 (1981).
8 Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982)).
9 Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984), continued by 50 Fed. Reg.
12,513 (Mar. 29, 1985).
10 Nuclear Pac., Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. C84-49R (W.D. Wash.June 8,
1984) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to
exhaust administrative remedies), reprinted in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS, supra
note 1, at 373.
'' 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701, 706, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521. Section 13(a) of the now
expired Export Administration Act of 1979 exempted functions exercised thereunder from
most APA provisions relating to procedure and judicial review.
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such complex and burdensome regulatory requirements may be im-
posed without specific authorizing legislation.
2. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)' 2 imple-
ment the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.13 The regulations cover
exports of defense services and defense articles identified by the U.S.
"Munitions List."' 4 The Office of Munitions Control of the State
Department administers the ITAR, with input from the Defense
Department.
The ITAR lacks specificity as to what types of computer equip-
ment and technology fall within its jurisdiction. Cryptographic de-
vices, privacy devices, software (encoding and decoding), and related
components' 5 are the only such products specifically listed in the
Munitions List, in Category XIII. Two general guidelines, however,
govern whether specific computer equipment or technology fall
under Category XI or XXI: 16 (1) if the product is designed to mili-
tary specifications or pursuant to a military contract; (2) if it is specif-
ically designed, modified, or configured for military application.
Because much of the computer equipment and software that
may fall within ITAR coverage is also sold for commercial use, the
lack of definition can be troublesome. The EAR governs the vast
majority of "dual-use" computer equipment and technology, but
where the jurisdictional line should be drawn in specific cases often
is not clear from the regulations alone.' 7 Even more troublesome is
12 49 Fed. Reg. 47,682-712 (1984) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-130 (1985))
(effective Jan. 1, 1985) [hereinafter citations will be to 22 C.F.R.].
t1 Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729, amended by International Security and Develop-
ment Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2751-2796(c) (1982)).
14 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 121.1 (1985).
15 Id. § 121.1(b) Cat. XIII(b) (1985).
16 Id. Cats. XI, XXI (1985). Category XI-Military and Space Electronics includes
"[e]lectronic equipment not included in Category XII of the Munitions List which is as-
signed a military designation or is specifically designed, modified or configured for mili-
tary application. This includes but is not limited to certain . specified equipment:
Category XXI-Miscellaneous Articles.
Any article not specifically enumerated in the other categories of the U.S.
Munitions List which has substantial military applicability and which has been
specifically designed for military purposes. The decision on whether any ar-
ticle may be included in this category shall be made by the Director of the
Office of Munitions Control.
See also 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (1985) (policy on designating defense articles and services).
17 Despite the burden put on the exporter to determine whether its product falls
within such vague regulations, in a recent case the district court dismissed an indictment of
conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act and regulations as invalid because the
terms "counter measures, counter-counter measures" specified in the regulations did not
constitute "items" that Congress had required to be made part of the Munitions List, and
the indictment based on exporting radar jamming devices failed to state a crime. United
States v. Zheng, 590 F. Supp. 274 (D.N.J. 1984).
The Zheng case provides useful language for arguments in many vague areas of export
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the fact that clearly commercial products being exported to military
end users may be detained by Customs Service officials for investiga-
tion, even if they are exported pursuant to a Validated License under
the EAR.
Therefore, in cases in which it is unclear which set of controls
applies-the EAR or the ITAR-it is useful to obtain a written deter-
mination from the Office of Munitions Control under its "commod-
ity jurisdiction procedure."' 8  Such a commodity jurisdiction
determination may provide assurance of legal compliance and also
assist in obtaining speedy release of mistaken detentions.
C. Reasons for EAR Controls/Principal Agency
The EAR contains four' 9 reasons for controlling exports: na-
tional security, foreign policy, nuclear nonproliferation, and short
supply. 20 The first three reasons apply to exports of computer
equipment and technology. 2'
1. National Security
The Export Administration Act authorized controls "to restrict
the export of goods and technology which would make a significant
contribution to the military potential of any other country or combi-
nation of countries which prove detrimental to the national security
of the United States."'22 The Defense Department is the principal
agency in charge of defining national security concerns applicable to
export licenses. In coordination with the Commerce Secretary, the
Defense Secretary is authorized to identify particular goods and
technology for inclusion in the "Commodity Control List" 23 and to
review export license applications and recommend disapproval of
those believed detrimental to U.S. national security. 24 Interagency
disagreements are to be resolved by the President. In effect, the De-
fense Department has taken the lead in this area. OEA refers to the
Defense Department export license applications that are subject to
national security controls, unless the Defense Department has
licensing regulations. It is significant, however, that the case was a criminal action, be-
cause it might not apply to the vast majority of cases in this area, which are civil.
18 22 C.F.R. § 120.5 (1985). It may be useful to consult the Military Critical Technol-
ogies List (MCTL), an unclassified version of which has recently been made public. De-
partment of Defense, The Military Critical Technologies List (Oct. 1984).
19 The EAR actually lists a fifth reason, crime control, but this is a part of the foreign
policy controls. See EAR § 399.1(i); EAA of 1979, § 6(j).
20 Id.
21 See EAR § 399.1, Export Control Commodity No. 1565A (electronic computers
and related equipment) [hereinafter cited as ECCN 1565A].
22 EAA of 1979, § 3(2)(A).
23 Id. § 5(c).
24 Id. § 10(g); EAR § 370.13(d).
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agreed that no such referral is necessary. 25
The Defense Department's role in export licensing recently has
been strengthened by the President, who, in a classified memoran-
dum signed by the National Security Affairs Advisor, has authorized
Defense to review certain license applications for export to fifteen
Free World destinations. 26 Previously, Defense had reviewed only
East Bloc cases and has sought to increase its authority because of its
concerns over diversion of high technology exports to the Soviet
Union and its allies. 27 The Commerce and Defense Departments
have been engaged in a turf battle, and the recent Presidential direc-
tive replaces a Memorandum of Understanding, which was drafted in
early 1984,28 but never signed. Because of the Defense Depart-
ment's conservative perspective on export licensing issues, its review
is expected to result in increased denials of some Free World
licenses and processing delays on many others.
To a great extent, national security controls are coordinated
among U.S. allies through the multilateral group known as the Con-
sultative Group Coordinating Committee (COCOM). 2 9 COCOM
members consist of the NATO countries, less Iceland and Spain,
plus Japan. The group is not a treaty organization, but purportedly
holds its status with the United States pursuant to a classified execu-
tive agreement. The United States also imposes controls unilaterally
when its COCOM allies do not agree with U.S. national security con-
cerns on particular exports. In the past, this has been particularly
true with respect to computer sales to East Bloc countries.30
25 It is the author's understanding that a classified, internal working memorandum
exists whereby the Defense Department has delegated to OEA authority to review applica-
tions for commodities falling below specified parameters.
26 See Pentagon Wins on Export Review, Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
Although the affected destinations have not been revealed, they are believed to include
Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, India, Lichtenstein, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Pakistan. The United States and India have been work-
ing on a bilateral agreement to prevent diversion and thereby ease controls on exports to
India. See Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1984, at DI, col. 3.
27 In one of the most celebrated of such cases, Digital Equipment Corp. agreed to a
consent decree imposing a $1.5 million fine ($400,000 of which is suspended as long as no
further violations occur for three years). This is the largest fine assessed under the Export
Administration Act to date, and it was the result of alleged dealings with Richard Mueller,
a West German believed to be a smuggler of computers and other high technology equip-
ment to the East Bloc. See Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1984, at Fl, col. 4. See also L. MEL-
VERN, D. HEBDITCH, & N. ANNING, TECHNO-BANDrrS (1984), abridged version reprinted in
COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 24, 1984, at ID/I, col. 1; Wall St. J., July 24, 1984, at 10, col. 6
(discussion of Western frustration at attempt to keep high technology out of Soviet hands).
•28 See, e.g., COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 2, 1984, at 14; Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1984, at
IA, col. 5.
29 See EAA of 1979, § 5(i).
30 See, e.g., U.S. Allies Restrict Technological Exports to Eastern Bloc, COMPUTERWORLD, July
30, 1984, at 16 (discussing U.S. persuasion of other COCOM members to place restric-
tions on exports of superminis, software distribution packages, high-performance personal
computers, and telecommunications switching systems in return for decontrol of certain
low-end computer equipment); Washington Post, July 17,. 1984, at Al, col. 2.
639
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The principal rationale for imposing national security controls
on exports of computers and similar goods is their potential for con-
tributing to the military capabilities of East Bloc countries and others
that pose a security threat. Although deficient in military manpower
and perhaps even firepower, the NATO countries have maintained a
technological advantage over Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, de-
fense experts wish to assure that the technological lead time is main-
tained, by restricting such exports and re-exports of the most
advanced technology and goods from which the technology can be
gleaned or which themselves can be used militarily as well as com-
mercially ("dual use").3' Hence, determining which exports are
likely to jeopardize national security is a subject on which reasonable
persons can differ.
2. Foreign Policy Controls
The Export Administration Act authorized controls "to restrict
the export of goods and technology where necessary to further sig-
nificantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its de-
clared international obligations. ' 32 The Commerce Department
administers foreign policy controls in consultation with the State De-
partment, principally through its Office of East-West Trade. Other
agencies also are consulted when appropriate. Although the State
Department does not have the effective veto power over Commerce
that Defense has in the national security area, in practice, OEA gen-
erally defers to State Department views on foreign policy issues.
Foreign policy controls periodically are imposed for a variety of
reasons: crime control/human rights; antiterrorism; nonsupport of
South African apartheid; regional stability (quasi-military items not
on the Munitions List); embargoes against North Korea, Vietnam,
Kampuchea, and Cuba;33 nonassistance to Libya; oil and gas equip-
ment for the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan; and truck manufacturing
equipment for the Soviet Kama River and ZIL truck plants.3 4
Although any of these reasons may apply to particular exports of
computer equipment and technology, computers have been singled
out for certain South Africa and Namibia controls:
A validated license is required for export of computers, as de-
31 See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 566-69.
32 EAA of 1979, § 3(2)(B). See also id. § 6(a).
33 These embargoes also are administered under the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch.
106, §§ 101(b), (c), 207, 40 Stat. 415 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b),
(c) (1982)).
34 See, e.g., Request for Comments on Effects of Foreign Policy Export Controls, 49 Fed. Reg.
47,047 (1984); Extension of Foreign Policy Export Controls, 49 Fed. Reg. 3061 (1984). Pursuant
to EAA of 1979, § 6, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, annually requests public comments on the extant foreign policy controls, reviews
the controls in accordance with specified criteria, revises and extends such controls as
deemed necessary, and reports his findings to Congress.
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fined in CCL entry 1565A, to the Department of Cooperation and
Development, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of
Community Development, the Department of Justice, the Depart-
ment of Manpower Utilization, and administrative bodies of the
"Homelands" that carry out similar functions. Applications for vali-
dated licenses will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-
case basis for exports of computers that would not be used to en-
force the South African policy of apartheid.
3 5
These controls are designed in part "to distance the United
States from the practice of apartheid."'3 6 According to State Depart-
ment officials, controlling exports of computers to be used by certain
South African Government agencies is seen as a highly visible means
of demonstrating United States antipathy toward apartheid because
those agencies purportedly make significant use of computers in ad-
ministering the apartheid policy. While perhaps having a laudable
purpose, the effect of these controls is largely symbolic because non-
U.S. suppliers readily meet the needs that go unfulfilled by U.S. com-
panies that are denied export licenses. Nevertheless, the controls
demonstrate how computers are singled out for export control
purposes.
3. Nuclear Nonproliferation
Pursuant to policies on national security and foreign policy in
sections 3(2)(A) and (B) of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
and section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,37
the EAR controls export transactions related to nuclear weapons or
explosive devices and the U.S. maritime nuclear propulsion policy
for the following reasons:
(1) To exercise the necessary vigilance from the standpoint of their
significance to the national security of the United States;
(2) To further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or
to fulfill its international responsibilities; and
(3) To maintain controls over items because of their potential sig-
nificance for nuclear explosive purposes.
3 8
The Commerce Department reviews export license applications in
this area in consultation with the Department of Energy.39
Although this article does not extensively discuss computer ex-
ports directly related to nuclear weapons, nuclear power, nuclear
propulsion, or nuclear research,40 it describes controls placed on
35 EAR § 385.4(a)(9). See also ECCN 1565A, supra note 21.
36 See Letters from Sec. of Commerce Lawrence J. Brady to President of the Senate
and Speaker of the House, Encl. 2, at 4 (transmitting reasons for extending foreign policy
controls).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2139a(c) (1982).
38 EAR § 378.1(a). See EAR § 378.2 (Nuclear Referral List).
39 See EAR § 378, Supp. No. 1 (discussing full procedures for nuclear controls, in-
cluding interagency review by the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination and higher
levels).
40 See generally EAR § 378.
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general purpose computers because of their capability for use in nu-
clear weapons or energy research and development. For two types
of computer exports, Validated Licenses are required, and the Distri-
bution License procedure 4' may not be used. The first set relates to
the intended end user, and the second to the power of the computer.
First, exports of electronic computers intended for end users en-
gaged, directly or indirectly, in designing, developing, researching,
training, or similar activities related to nuclear weapons or nuclear
energy require individual Validated Licenses. 42 Export license appli-
cations for such end users are referred to the Energy Department for
review, based on reliability of the end user and capabilities and in-
tended use of the equipment. Exports to nuclear facilities that do
not allow inspections to determine compliance with international
safeguards will be strictly scrutinized, and licenses may be denied.
Second, exports of computers with "processing date rates" 43
(PDR) above certain parameters require individual Validated
Licenses.44 The PDR is a measure developed for export licensing
purposes rather than a general industry specification and is intended
to describe the speed at which computers can perform. High-speed
computers, with large memory access, are necessary and useful for
nuclear-related "number-crunching." The relative PDR limits are
divided into three country groups. For those countries that have
signed neither the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty45 nor the
Treaty of Tlatelolco,46 computers with a PDR greater than twenty
million bits per second (mbs) require individual Validated
Licenses. 47 Exports of computers to those signatories listed in Sup-
plement No. 3 to EAR section 373 require individual Validated
Licenses if the PDR exceeds sixty mbs.4 8 Exports to those listed in
Supplement No. 2, essentially the COCOM members, require indi-
vidual Validated Licenses only if the PDR exceeds two hundred
twenty-five mbs.49
41 See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
42 EAR §§ 373, Supp. No. 1, ECCN 1565 n.4; 399.1, Supp. No. 1, ECCN 1565A;
399.2, Supp. No. 1, Commodity Interp. No. 1(a).
43 See EAR § 376.10(a)(4)(iv) (definition of PDR), revised by 49 Fed. Reg. 50,608
(1984) (Advisory Note 16 to ECCN 1565A).
44 EAR §§ 373, Supp. No. 1, ECCN 1565; 379.1, Supp. No. 1, ECCN 1565A; 399.2,
Supp. No. 1, Commodity Interp. No. 1(b).
Note that the parallel references to CPU bus rate, formerly defined at EAR
§ 376.10(a)(4)(i), have been eliminated from consideration. 49 Fed. Reg. 40,568 (1984).
The industry long argued that the CPU bus rate was an invalid measure of computer per-
formance, and there is debate over the propriety of the PDR measure as well.
45 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
46 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 326.
47 See EAR §§ 373, Supps. Nos. 2, 3, and 378, Supp. No. 2 for signatories.
48 EAR § 373, Supp. No. 3.
49 EAR § 373, Supp. No. 2.
[VOL. 10
1985] EXPORT LICENSING OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT
Thus, companies having a Distribution License must determine
which of their computers will require individual licenses to what
countries. The impact is greatest on exports to nonsignatory coun-
tries because the PDR threshold of twenty mbs is quite low, and
many of the more sophisticated personal computers are above the
threshold. Some of the countries affected are Argentina, Brazil,
Israel, India, and South Africa.
As an alternative to individual licenses for each computer, it is
sometimes possible to obtain individual Validated Licenses to export
a year's supply of specified computers and related equipment to a
distributor in one of these countries, with up-front authorization to
resell. Specified nonnuclear end-use or distribution statements may
be required from the consignee/distributor. 50 The EAR does not
specifically provide for this, but such end-use assurances are re-
quested pursuant to the authority given to Licensing Officers to re-
quest whatever additional information OEA deems necessary. 51
Unfortunately, OEA will often "Return without Action" license ap-
plications that do not contain such an end-user certification. The
resulting delay especially hinders smaller businesses with less experi-
ence in exporting than their multinational competitors.
D. Destinations/Country Groups
Four principal criteria are considered by OEA in evaluating ex-
port license applications: destination, nature of the commodity or
technical data, end user and end use, and foreign availability. 52 Des-
tination is one of the most important criteria.
The EAR divides the world into seven country groups desig-
50 An example of a "standard" written assurance for a South African distributor that
incorporates other South African restrictions in EAR § 385.4(a) is as follows:
I (we) certify that the commodities and/or technical data received under this
license will not be sold or otherwise made available, directly or indirectly, to
or for use by or for military, policy or nuclear entities of the Republic of
South Africa or Namibia, Department of Cooperation and Development, De-
partment of Internal Affairs, Department of Community Development, De-
partment of Justice, Department of Manpower Utilization and the
Administrative bodies of the Homelands that carry out similar functions in
the Republic of South Africa.
See id.
51 EAR § 372.5.
52 EAA of 1979, § 5(f) required the Commerce Department to set up a system of
reviewing whether goods controlled for national security purposes were nevertheless avail-
able to, for example, East Bloc countries from other sources, and to consider such infor-
mation favorably on export license review. Although OEA purportedly has considered
foreign availability as a factor in licensing decisions (see EAR § 370.1 (b)(3)(vi)), it is now
beginning to set up a system to review foreign availability in a sophisticated manner. See
Department of Commerce, ExPORT ADMIN. BuLL. No. 230 at 2 (Apr. 20, 1984) (announc-
ing establishment of Foreign Availability Assessment Division of OEA). -See also 50 Fed.
Reg. 10,501 (Mar. 1, 1985) (proposed "foreign availability" regulations). It will be up to
applicants to provide evidence that comparable goods are available to end-users from
third sources if they hope to influence classification and licensing decisions.
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nated by the symbols Q S, T, V, W, Y, and Z.53 Canada is treated
separately by name and, for the most part, exports to Canada may be
made freely. 54 Exports are considered differently with respect to
each of these groups, in the following order of increasing liberality.
1. Embargoed Countries (S and Z)
Country Group S currently consists of Libya only, and Z coun-
tries are Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, and Vietnam. Except for
books and films, Validated Licenses are required for export of all
commodities and proprietary technical data.55 Generally, applica-
tions for export of computer equipment and technology to S and Z
destinations will be denied. 56 With respect to Cuba and Libya, there
are de minimus rules under which exports from third countries of
non-U.S. goods containing less than twenty percent U.S. origin
parts, components, or materials will be considered favorably. 57
2. East Bloc and Laos (Q W, and Y)
Export license applications for exports to the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact countries, Albania, the Mongolian People's Re-
public, and Laos are reviewed strictly and approved only if the ex-
ports are for civilian end use and would not contribute significantly
to the military potential of such countries or otherwise contravene
specific U.S. foreign policies. 58 Because of their significant capability
for military, as well as civilian, end use, computers especially are
scrutinized in such export license applications. A special Form
6031P, Computer System Parameters, along with other detailed in-
formation, must be included with export license applications for
electronic computers and related equipment for these countries and
the People's Republic of China. 59 This Form has specified computer
parameters categorized in boxes A through D. COCOM review of
applications with parameters falling in boxes C and D likely will be
53 For a complete list of countries under each country group, see Supplement No. 1
to EAR § 370.
54 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
55 For Country Groups requiring Validated Licenses, see individual CCL entries EAR
§ 399.1, Supp. No. 1.
56 See generally EAR §§ 385.1 (policy on exports to Country Group Z), 385.7 (same re
Country Group S).
57 EAR §§ 385.1(b), 385.7(a)(2)(i)(C).
58 See generally EAR § 385.2 (policy).
59 EAR § 376.10(a)(1). Form 6031P and EAR § 376.10 are being revised to imple-
ment regulatory changes governing computers. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying
text. Computer equipment, with parameters all below the levels in Advisory Note 9 to
ECCN 1565A can be approved for export to East Bloc countries without COCOM review.
Those with parameters beyond the Note 9 limits but all below the parameters listed in
Advisory Note 12 require COCOM review after a U.S. recommendation of approval, but
will be approved if no COCOM Member objects within 30 days. Those with parameters
above the Note 12 limits require a 90-day COCOM review, and any COCOM Member may
veto such an export.
[VOL. 10644
1985] EXPORT LICENSING OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT
required after U.S. agencies have completed their reviews and have
recommended approval. Such applications also must contain de-
tailed statements of end use by the customer and from the applicant.
In addition, visitation requirements may be imposed.60
3. Free World Countries (T and V)
Country Group T contains primarily the Latin American coun-
tries, and Country Group V contains all other countries not listed in
a particular Country Group. Generally, these countries are treated
similarly with respect to types of exports that require a Validated Li-
cense. Particular countries are treated with varying degrees of liber-
ality, however, depending on the possibility of diversion to other
destinations, other national security or foreign policy concerns, and
nuclear nonproliferation concerns. The following list subdivides
some of these countries, in order of increasing liberality, according
to this author's experience. 61
a. The People's Republic of China and Afghanistan;62
b. Special Sensitivities (nuclear or foreign policy including diver-
sion potential): India, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Israel, South Af-
rica,63 Yemen, Syria, Iran, 64 Iraq,65 Pakistan, South Korea, Hong
Kong;
c. Certain Neutral Countries: Austria, Finland, Lichtenstein, Sin-
gapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia;
d. Others not listed;
e. COCOM Members: (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom).66
E. Licensing of Commodities and Technology Exports (Hardware and
Software)
For some time, there have been two separate, though parallel,
60 EAR § 376.10(a)(2), (3).
61 See generally EAR § 385.4 (policy on exports to Country Groups T and V).
62 See EAR §§ 385.4(c) (policy on exports to People's Republic of China), 385.4(f)
(Afghanistan). On November 21, 1983, OEA revised the EAR to place the People's Re-
public of China in Country Group V instead of the former Country Group P. 48 Fed. Reg.
53,064. Despite the announcements that the United States was liberalizing export con-
trols on trade with China and treating them like a Free World country, a careful review by
this author revealed that, in almost every significant instance where the EAR treats exports
to V destinations more liberally than to Q W, and Y destinations, the People's Republic of
China specifically is excepted and treated more as before. See also McKenzie, China and
U.S. Trade: Recent Export Regulations, 18 INT'L LAW. 455 (1984).
63 See EAR § 385.4(a) (antiapartheid foreign policy controls on exports to South
Africa).
64 See EAR § 385.4(d) (antiterrorism policy on exports to Yemen, Syria, and Iran).
65 See EAR § 385.4(e) (policy re Iran-Iraq war).
66 See EAR § 374.3(e)(1)(ii).
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licensing schemes for exports of commodities and technical data. 67
The long expected implementation of the Military Critical Technolo-
gies List should achieve a further integration of these schemes. 68
Because OEA currently is revising section 379 of the EAR, this arti-
cle does not discuss technical data in general, 69 but concentrates on
exports of computer-related hardware and the evolving schemes for
software licensing. The EAR's changing regulation of software ex-
emplifies this increasing merger of commodity and technical data
regulation, as it has moved from a fairly confusing mixture of com-
modities and technical data controls over most software to a no less
confusing mixture of treating some types of software programs as
commodities and others as a mixture.
1. Commodity Classification-The "Commodity Control List"
(CCL)
The first step in determining whether a Validated License is re-
quired to export a particular commodity is to examine the CCL.70
The CCL, particularly Group 5, which governs Electronics and Preci-
sion Instruments with respect to computer-related commodities, lists
virtually all commodities not covered by other export control juris-
dictions and sets forth which country group destinations require
Validiated Licenses pursuant to the applicable Export Control Com-
modity Number (ECCN). Therefore, determining what ECCN ap-
plies to a particular commodity is crucial. Unfortunately, the CCL
often is so complex and vague because of an inability to keep pace
with changing product technology that it takes a combination of law-
yers, engineers, and businesspersons to determine the appropriate
ECCN.
Frequently, a commodity classification request should be filed
with OEA to achieve maximum assurance that exports will be made
legally and appropriately. Exporters should approach such requests
as advocates because most marketing brochures "oversell" their
products and may alter the classification that would be made from
straight examination of the product specifications. Furthermore, as
with any regulations, the CCL is subject to different interpretations.
Few businesspersons would approach a tariff classification issue with-
67 See EAR § 379 for rules governing exports of technical data.
68 EAA of 1979, § 5(d), required the Secretary of Defense to develop an MCTL for
the purpose of assuring that national security export controls are limited to military critical
goods and technologies and the mechanism through which they may be effectively trans-
ferred. The list was intended to become part of the CCL. In conjunction with this difficult
effort, OEA has also been redrafting EAR § 379 to incorporate the MCTL concept but has
issued no proposed regulations as of this date. See also supra note 18.
69 See generally Conner, An Introduction to U.S. Government Controls on Exports of Technol-
ogy, in CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
191 (1980).
70 See EAR § 399.1, Supp. No. 1; § 399.2, Supp. No. I (commodity interpretations).
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out seeking to persuade the Customs Service as to the applicable
TSUS, because the ad valorem percentage difference between two po-
tentially applicable classifications will have an obvious monetary im-
pact. While not as readily apparent, the administrative costs of
having to make virtually all exports under Validated Licenses when
they could be made under General Licenses are important. 71
Set forth below are the principal ECCNs that govern general
purpose computer equipment and require Validated Licenses for ex-
port to all destinations other than Canada.
ECCN 1564A - Electronic component assemblies, subassemblies,
printed circuit boards, and microcircuits;
ECCN 1565A - Electronic computers and related equipment;
ECCN 1572A - Recording and/or reproducing equipment (if ex-
ported with computers, covered by ECCN
1565A);
ECCN 1527A - Cryptographic and ancillary equipment;
ECCN 1529A - Electronic measuring, testing, and calibrating
equipment, and digital instruments incorporating
a computer;
ECCN 4529A - Computerized electronic testing equipment (now
removed) ;72
ECCN 1541A - Cathode-ray tubes;
ECCN 4590B - Multispectral/digital image processing/display
systems.
The parameters under each ECCN should be studied carefully
to determine whether a product falls within its coverage. Also, the
full CCL should be consulted, because other ECCNs not listed above
may apply to more specialized computer equipment.
As the computer industry moves forward, the CCL is changed
constantly so as hopefully to keep pace and to control only those
71 For example, certain commmodities may qualify as "General Industrial Equip-
ment" under ECCN 6399G and require Validated Licenses only for export to S and Z
destinations. See EAR § 399.2, Supp. No. 1, Commodity Interp. No. 29. As such products
increasingly are improved and, rely more on computers, the classification may change to
ECCN 1529A or 1565A, particularly in view of the revisions to ECCN 1565A governing
equipment "associated" with computers or containing an "incorporated" or "embedded"
computer. The point at which the classification will change can be determined only on a
case-by-case basis, and commodity classification determinations often provide essential as-
surance in a case in which a Customs Inspector believes a more restrictive classification is
warranted.
When it is necessary to export before obtaining a commodity classification determina-
tion, it is wise to apply for a Validated License simultaneously with a classification request
and to note on the face of the license application that such a request has been filed, but
that the application processing should not be delayed.
72 For years ECCN 4529B and its predecessors applied unilateral controls to certain
exports. 4529B was recently removed from the CCL because COCOM agreed to control
such exports multilaterally. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,608, 50,632 (1984). This move may be good
for industry because ECCN 4529B often was used as catch-all category to control exports
of many devices that incorporated microprocessors, and much effort was devoted by cer-
tain industries to declassify such goods by moving them to ECCNs 6399G or 6599G. See
49 Fed. Reg. 17,932 (1984). It remains to be seen whether ECCN 1529A and the newly
revised 1565A will be used in a similar fashion.
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exports deemed "strategic." While regulatory changes in the CCL
lag far behind technological progressions, and too few products are
decontrolled for most exporters' liking, the amendments should be
reviewed carefully by knowledgeable technicians and attorneys for
helpful changes. In addition, such amendments may create Vali-
dated License requirements for certain exports not previously sub-
ject to control. Such was the case recently when the Commerce
Department announced that it was "decontrolling" 73 exports of cer-
tain low-end computer equipment pursuant to a revision of multilat-
eral export controls by COCOM.74 These amendments decontrolled
certain low-end equipment but also imposed export controls on cer-
tain types of "strategic" software not previously subject to Validated
License requirements by adding a new ECCN 1566A-" 'Software'
and technology therefor for equipment described . . . therein." 7 5
Also, it appears likely that the new 1565A regulations will impose
export controls on certain equipment that contains an "incorpo-
rated" or "embedded" computer or microprocessor, but the proper
interpretation of those terms has not yet been settled.
2. Software
The regulation of software exports has been in a state of flux,
and further regulatory changes are anticipated. A few years ago, the
export licensing community debated whether software exports were
controlled as "commodities" under the CCL or as "technical data"
under EAR section 379. Many have argued persuasively that some
types of software programs were not controlled at all because they
were not commodities and did not meet the definition of "technical
data." 76
73 The term "decontrol" and similar terms often are used in export licensing lexicon
to describe regulatory changes that lift Validated License requirements for exports of cer-
tain commodities to certain destinations, e.g., by changing the ECCN classification from
1565A to 6599G.
74 See Fed. Reg. 50,608 (effective Jan. 1, 1985, with savings clause allowing orders
before January 15, to be shipped under old general license provisions up to January 29,
1985), as amended by 50 Fed. Reg. 4503 Uan. 31, 1985) (extending savings clause to April
29, 1985). See also Export Rules Relaxed for Low and Only, CoMpurrERWORLD, Jan. 14, 1985, at
89; Commerce Lifts Controls on Many Embedded CPUs, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Jan. 7, 1985, at 4.
75 Id. at 50,622. Subsection (h)(2) of the newly revised ECCN 1565A contains the
decontrol provisions. If an exporter can satisfy itself that its products are decontrolled by
those regulations, they can be exported under General License G-DEST to most countries.
In contrast, the only prior procedure for decontrolling certain low end computers was by
an application for Commerce Department approval pursuant to EAR § 376.10(a)(5).
76 The definition of "technical data" in the EAR is quite broad.
"Technical Data" means information of any kind that can be used, or
adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture, utilization, or re-
construction of articles or materials. The data may take a tangible form, such
as a model, prototype, blueprint, or an operating manual; or they may take
an intangible form such as technical service.
EAR § 379.1(a) (footnotes omitted). Software now has been specifically defined in the
EAR in ECCN 1566A:
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As recently as July 1983, in a memorandum distributed by the
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations to its mem-
bers, 77 this author indicated that exports of most types of software
could be made to most Free World (T and V) countries under Gen-
eral Licenses as long as the exporter followed the EAR and had ob-
tained written assurances from the end user/customer that it would
not re-export the software or related technical data, or any direct
product thereof, to any Q S, W, Y, or Z destinations. Most types of
software were treated as a combination of technical data (the pro-
grams) and commodities (the media).
Certain exceptions that still exist in the CCL treated four types
of software as commodities: software exported in conjunction with
computer hardware (ECCN 1565A); software designed for use with
numerically controlled machine tools (as defined in ECCN 1091A);
Computer Aided Design software usable in the manufacture or de-
velopment of integrated circuits (as defined in ECCN
1355A(b)(2)(iv)); and software designed to control or perform the
function of cryptographic equipment (as defined in ECCN 1527A).
In addition, Validated Licenses often were and still are required for
exports to all destinations of software designed for use for any air-
craft equipment or military end uses or intended for use in connec-
tion with nuclear activities. 78 Also, media exceeding the limits set
forth in Exception 3 to ECCN 1572A require a Validated License for
export to most countries.
Although software exporters had to examine a checklist carefully
and review the destination before exporting,79 the vast majority of
software exports to T and V destinations could be made without Val-
idated Licenses pursuant to the requirements of General License
"Software"-
A collection of one or more "programs" or "microprograms" fixed in
any tangible medium of expression.
"Program"-
A sequence of instructions to carry out a process in, or convertible into,
a form executable by an electronic computer.
"Microprogram"-
A sequence of elementary instructions, maintained in a special storage,
the execution of which is initiated by the introduction of its reference instruc-
tion into an instruction register.
49 Fed. Reg. 50,608, 50,623 (1984) (adding ECCN 1566A, Technical Note No. 1), trans-
ferred to EAR § 379, Supp. No. 3, by 50 Fed. Reg. 16,468 (Apr. 26, 1985). Software has
further been categorized as development system software, programming system software,
maintenance system software, operating system software, and application software. See id.
(Technical Note No. 2). Also, the broad definitions of "export" and "re-export" of techni-
cal data in EAR § 379.1 (b) and (c) apply to all software. Id. at 50,609 (amending EAR
§ 379.4(g)).
77 Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Memorandum on U.S. Export Controls over
Exports of Computer Software (July 1983) (available from ADAPSO).
78 See EAR § 379.4(c), (d).
79 It is rare that software exports can be made under General License GTDR to
Country Groups 0, S, W, Y, or Z or Afghanistan or the People's Republic of China. See
EAR § 379.4(a), (b), (i).
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GTDR80 for the program and G-DEST 81 or GLV for the media. The
list of exceptions, however, has increased. In March 1984, as a result
of COCOM review of the CCL, the EAR added two new types of
software programs to the list of those included on the CCL: specially
designed software for equipment made for manufacturing or testing
printed circuit boards and related components and accessories
(ECCN 1354A); and specially designed software for precision linear
and angular measuring systems (ECCN 1532A).8 2 The United States
was still pressing its allies in COCOM to go further in controlling
software exports,83 and in midsummer 1984 COCOM members
agreed to restrict a host of software that have potential strategic
uses .84
As a result, the EAR was amended on December 31, 1984, to
add two new ECCNs governing software. The first is the broadest
yet-ECCN 1566A, which is the first specific category dedicated
solely to software exports. Software exporters should review the
technical parameters of this category because the category covers a
number of software systems that previously did not require Vali-
dated Licenses. Also added to the regulations was specially designed
software for the use of stored program controlled communciation
switching equipment or systems (ECCN 1567A). As this article was
going to press, the EAR was amended by removing the new ECCN 1566A from
the CCL and transferring its substantive provisions to a new Supplement No. 3
to EAR § 379, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,468 (Apr. 26, 1985). This change again
treats most software as technical data and removes validated license require-
ments for exports of software covered under EAR § 379, Supp. No. 3, to T and
V Country Groups.
Thus, software exporters first should review the CCL to deter-
mine whether their software programs are covered by a particular
ECCN. Reference to EAR section 379.4(g) should alert exporters to
what ECCNs on the CCL cover software exports. All software listed
in those ECCNs currently requires a Validated License for export to
any destination other than Canada. Second, all software exports not
covered by a CCL entry must comply with the technical data provi-
sions of EAR section 379. In general, this means that Validated
Licenses will be required for exports to Q S, W, Y, and Z destina-
tions, as well as Afghanistan 85 and the People's Republic of China.86
80 See EAR § 379.4.
81 See infra text accompanying note 114. See also EAR § 399.1, Supp. No. 1, ECCN
1572A.
82 49 Fed. Reg. 12,678 (1984) (amending EAR §§ 379.4(g); 399.1, Supp. No. 1).
83 See U.S. Asks Allies to Curb Software Exports, Washington Post, Apr. 14, 1984, at D9,
col. 3.
84 See U.S., Allies Restrict Technological Exports to East Bloc, COMPUrERWORLD, July 30,
1984, at 16; Allies Agree To Restrict Computer Sales to East Bloc, Washington Post, July 17,
1984, at IA, col. 2.
85 See EAR § 379.4(a), (b).
86 See EAR § 379.4(i).
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Validated Licenses may be required for exports of software designed
for use for any aircraft equipment or military end-uses or intended
for use in connection with any kind of nuclear activities.8 7 Other re-
strictions apply to exports to South Africa and Namibia.88
All other software programs that pass these tests should qualify
for export under General License GTDR8 9 as long as written assur-
ances have been obtained from the end-user customer prior to ex-
port that the software or its direct product will not be exported to
Country Groups Q S, W, Y, or Z, or Afghanistan or the People's
Republic of China. 90 Finally, one should assure that the media on
which the software programs are stored qualify for General License
G-DEST treatment pursuant to ECCN 1572A.
Unfortunately for software exporters, the earlier days of light
restrictions on most exports have passed, and the EAR's coverage of
software has become more complex and burdensome. Given the de-
sire of the United States to control software exports more vigor-
ously, further changes can be expected.
F. Re-Exports
The U.S. Government asserts broad extraterritorial jurisdiction
over "re-exports" 91 from outside the United States to other destina-
tions. Prior authorization from the OEA is required for re-exports of
U.S. origin commodities and technical data,92 U.S. origin parts and
components incorporated in foreign made commodities, 93 and cer-
tain commodities manufactured abroad by use of United States tech-
nical data and destined for certain prohibited countries. 94
87 See EAR § 379.4(c), (d) for details.
88 See EAR § 379.4(e) (restrictions apply where reason to know of intended end use
by or for South African military or police entities, and special written assurance require-
ments for all others).
89 EAR § 379.4.
90 EAR § 379.4(f) (written assurance requirements). Written assurances may be
made in many forms, and often an exporter of software can argue successfully that clauses
in a license agreement restricting copying or distribution of the software program without
specific written permission from the U.S. licensor are adequate. More specific export-re-
lated written assurance provisions are preferable, however, and should be included in all
licensing agreements.
91 "The term 're-export' in the [EAR], or any license, order, or export control docu-
ment issued thereunder, includes re-export, transshipment, or diversion of commodities
or technical data from one foreign destination to another." EAR § 370.2.
92 EAR § 374.1(a).
93 EAR § 376.12. This short regulation is the basis for an entire unwritten set of
procedures for obtaining a type of "Validated License," called a "Parts and Components
Authorization." The three-part test in EAR § 376.12 (note) should be reviewed to deter-
mine if a P&C authorization is required prior to re-export of the U.S. parts and compo-
nents contained in the foreign end product. If so, OEA should be consulted as to the
information it will require on a P&C application, which requirements are not set forth in
the EAR.
94 See EAR § 379.8(a)(3).
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In addition, exports made from the United States that the ex-
porter has reason to know are intended to be re-exported, directly or
indirectly, require prior authorization from OEA.95 Otherwise, ille-
gal re-exports by an overseas customer may result in liability for the
United States exporter.
Certain re-exports may be made without prior OEA authoriza-
tion, generally if they could have been exported from the United
States under a General License.96 For re-exports not falling within
these guidelines, the procedures in EAR section 374 should be
followed.
U.S. trading partners have vociferously challenged the legality
and propriety of the U.S. assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
these areas, particularly when extraterritorial controls are imposed
on foreign policy as opposed to direct national security grounds.97
The issue has not yet been fully litigated in court, 98 but the debate
continues.
G. Enforcement
An entire article could be devoted to the subject of export con-
trol enforcement 99 because the topic is broader and more important
than coverage in this overview reasonably can provide. The objec-
tive of most exporters is to avoid having to address enforcement is-
sues entirely, hopefully by complying with the law. Some mistakes
are inevitable even for the most careful exporters, however, and the
emphasis on tougher enforcement of export control laws makes risk
awareness even more important.
Two principal agencies currently are responsible for enforce-
ment. The U.S. Customs Service reviews exports at the border and
is in the position to intercept individual shipments violating the ex-
95 EAR § 374.1(b).
96 See EAR § 374.2 (permissive re-exports).
97 See generally Yittman, Extra-Territorial Application of U.S. Export Control Laws on Foreign
Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations: An American Lawyer's View from Europe, 16 INT'L LAw. 737
(1982).
98 In the Siberian Gas Pipeline case of 1982, President Reagan's authority to enforce
extraterritorial controls was never determined because the controls were lifted before
court challenges were decided. See Hunt, Export Administration Act Penalties and Enforcement
Process, THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS, supra note 1, at 225, 246.
In most cases in which an export has been made under a Validated License, the for-
eign consignee will have signed a form agreeing not to re-export without U.S. Government
permission. See EAR §§ 375, 379.4(f); Forms ITA-629, Statement by Ultimate Consignee
or Purchaser, ITA-645P, International Import Certificate, ITA 6052, Statement by Foreign
Consignee in Support of Special License Application. Arguably, such statements consti-
tute a consent to U.S.jurisdiction. Notice is also provided on all shipments by destination
control statements under EAR § 386.6. On the other hand, foreign customers have no
choice but to execute such documents if they wish to purchase U.S. products.
99 See generally Hunt, supra note 98; Murphy, Enforcement of Export Controls: A Private
Practitioner's Perspective, THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS, supra note 1, at 291.
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port control laws. Its heavily publicized "Operation Exodus"' 0 0 has
been quite aggressive in detaining exports believed to be illegal. In
1981 the Commerce Department set up a special agency with the
same status as OEA, the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE).' 0'
While the Commerce Department has primary authority for enforce-
ment of the Export Administration Act of 1979, it works in coordina-
tion with the Customs Service.' 0 2 The turf battle over which agency
should have primary jurisdiction over enforcement activity is still be-
ing fought in Congress.
1. Commerce Department Enforced Penalties
Criminal penalties for violations of the EAR range from the
greater of $1 million or five times the export value for companies.
For individuals, such penalties are up to $250,000 and/or ten years
in prison.' 03 Traditionally, criminal penalties rarely were sought,
but the Government has been seeking criminal indictments in
greater numbers in recent years.' 0 4
Civil penalties may include up to $10,000 per violation and,
even more damaging, denial of the privilege to export or participate
in U.S. export activities. 10 5 Such penalties can add up quickly, as
evidenced in the recent case settled by Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion for a $1.5 million fine. 10 6 Civil law enforcement responses re-
quire carefully planned and tactful advocacy because judicial review
is precluded.10 7
OEE investigations may stem from a particular violation, but
they are comprehensive and usually focus on the exporter's history
of, and efforts toward, compliance with the EAR and cooperation
with the investigation. Thus, exporters subjected to "charging let-
ters" and resulting compliance investigations must decide with their
attorneys whether to disclose voluntarily or invoke the fifth amend-
100 In Fiscal Year 1983 the Defense Department provided $30 million from its budget
to the Customs Service for Operation Exodus. Department of Defense, Report to the 98th
Cong. on the Technology Transfer Control Program 55 (Feb. 1984).
101 See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT AD. ANN. REP. FY 1982, 55-56 (1983). Theodore
Wu, a former federal prosecutor, was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export
Enforcement.
102 See White House Press Release of Mar. 23, 1984, reprinted in THE COMMERCE DE-
PARTMENT SPEAKS, supra note 1, at 365.
103 EAR § 387.1(a). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1984); EAR § 387.1(a)(2) (violation of
False Statements Act); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1984) (general conspiracy).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1875 (1983); United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Molter-Butcher, 506 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass.), appeal dis-
missed, 723 F.2d 189 (lst Cir. 1983). See also McDonough & Roosevelt, Criminal Actions
Under Export Act Present Catch-22, Wash. Legal Times, May 14, 1984, at 32.
105 EAR § 387.1(b).
106 See Digital Equipmnt Corp. Fined $1.5 Million by U.S., Washington Post, Sept. 5,
1984, at Fl, col. 4.
107 See EAA of 1979, § 13.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ment privilege against self-incrimination, realizing of course that the
corporate entity cannot claim such a fifth amendment privilege.
Such decisions can be made only on a case-by-case basis, but most
exporters choose to disclose and cooperate after careful review.' 08
Of course, the same issues arise in a different context when a com-
pany itself discovers a series of (hopefully inadvertent) violations.
2. Customs Service (OPEX) Enforcement' 9
If a Customs Inspector believes a particular shipment is being
exported in violation of the EAR, he will "detain" the shipment for
investigation. Generally, he will notify the exporter, or at least its
freight forwarder, and request information. Prompt action may re-
sult in early release of shipments that are in fact legal but may have
technical problems in documentation. Even if the shipment is in
compliance, the detention delay may harm the exporter's business.
Simultaneously, the Inspector will consult with OEA/OEE officials to
determine whether a violation exists. If Customs and OEA finds the
export to be illegal, the "detention" becomes a "seizure."
Upon seizing a shipment, Customs begins its own penalty pro-
ceedings. Generally, the exporter may post a bond equal to a per-
centage of the value of the goods and export them if a proper license
has been obtained. Forfeiture proceedings involve fines ranging
from forfeiture to fractional values of the goods, but fines generally
range from ten percent of valuation or less.
Even though fines may be minimal, it is important to file timely a
"Petition for Mitigation of Fine or Forfeiture" with appropriate doc-
umentation to establish a record of reasons for the violation and
steps taken to correct any problems. Additionally, such petitions can
minimize the likelihood that OEE will view an isolated case as the
"tip of the iceberg" and conduct a more in-depth investigation. Par-
allel citations for the same offense are possible because double jeop-
ardy protection does not apply in civil proceedings.
3. Potential Liability for Domestic Sales
Illegal exports by domestic customers also can make the original
seller vicariously liable in certain circumstances. If a U.S. sale is
made when there is reason to know that goods are intended to be re-
exported illegally, the original seller may be held liable, as well as the
108 EAR § 387.5(c) requires disclosure of change in material fact after representations,
statements, or certifications have been made. See also EAR § 372.7(b) (disclosure to OEE
required of exports made without a required validated license).
109 Regulations for Customs enforcement procedures are few. Authority to seize
goods exported in violation of the law is taken from 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). See also EAR
§§ 386.8, 387.1(b)(4); Bureau of Customs Cir. EXP-3-PEN (Dec. 28, 1966) (export con-
trol; settlement of forfeitures for violation of export control regulations of Commerce
Department).
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exporter.110 For example, consider a company that has tried repeat-
edly to export a particular computer to a Libyan concern only to
have had OEA categorically deny it a license. The company is then
approached by a U.S. person whom he knows is an agent of the Lib-
yan concern and who requests to buy the same computer, saying,
"Let me worry about the export license." If the computer ends up in
Libya illegally, the U.S. company's exculpatory clause in its contract
with the agent probably will not help. I' Such clauses, which notify
most domestic customers of sensitive products for which United
States Government export authorization is required are recom-
mended for normal sales, however.
III. Methods of Licensing
A. General Licenses
General Licenses" 2 require neither filing of an export license
application nor issuance of a license document (except GTE), only
self adherence to regulatory requirements. Some of the more impor-
tant General Licenses for computer equipment shipments are dis-
cussed below." 13
General License G-DEST' t4 perhaps is the most often used li-
cense. It applies to a particular export only if upon examining the
CCL it is concluded that a Validated License is not required for ex-
port of commodities under the applicable ECCN. Unfortunately,
most computer-related commodities will not qualifiy for G-DEST
treatment unless it can be established that ECCNs 6399G or 6599G
apply instead of, for example, 1565A.
General License GLV" 1 5 also is important for exports of limited
value. Each ECCN sets forth a GLV threshold, and exports falling
below such levels qualify for GLV for the countries specified. Ship-
ments cannot be split to qualify for GLV, however, and close atten-
tion must be paid to the definition of "value" in the regulation."i 6
Portable personal computers, testing equipment, and similar de-
vices generally can be exported temporarily for use or servicing and
returned pursuant to the provisions of General License BAG-
GAGE 117 or GTE." t8 BAGGAGE applies if the person carrying out
10 See EAR §§ 387.2 (causing, aiding, and abetting a violation), 387.3 (solicitation,
contempt, and conspiracy), 387.4 (acting with knowledge of a violation).
I! I See, e.g., In re Applied Sys. Corp., Dep't of State (Sept. 20, 1982) (consent decree),
reprinted in Dep't of State, Munitions Control Newsletter No. 97 (Oct. 1982).
112 EAR § 371.1.
113 See also EAR §§ 371.21, 379.3, 379.4 (GTDA and GTDR for technical data
exports).
114 EAR § 371.3.
115 EAR § 371.5.
116 Generally, "value'! constitutes the greater of the actual selling price or market
price. Id. § 371.5(b)(1).
117 EAR § 371.6.
118 EAR § 371.22.
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the good personally owns it, while GTE is used if the product is
owned by the employer. GTE requires prior application and OEA
validation of the exporter's certification. 119
General License GLR 120 can be used for return or replacement
of certain commodities, pursuant to servicing under warranty. Its re-
quirements are specific, and it can be used only for goods originally
exported under Validated Licenses. For instance, a copying machine
originally exported G-DEST cannot be serviced GLR if its
microprocessor is defective, and a Validated License must be ob-
tained to export a new microprocessor.
General License GTE121 authorizes certain temporary exports
intended to be returned within one year. A specific certification must
be validated by OEA and a GTE registration number assigned before
exporting such items as tools of the trade, temporary exports for
demonstration in T and V countries, items sent for inspection, test-
ing, or repair, and others.' 22
General Licenses provide the easiest mechanism for exporting
qualified items. Nevertheless, because they are based on self adher-
ence, exporters carefully should assure that they come within the
particular regulations and otherwise comply with EAR requirements.
B. Individual Validated Licenses
Generally, applications for individual exports (Form ITA-622P)
or re-exports (Form ITA-699P) are completed pursuant to instruc-
tions, 12 3 filed with OEA, reviewed, validated with or without condi-
tions, and returned to the applicant or its authorized agent. Exports
then may be made pursuant to the terms of the license and in accord-
ance with the export clearance procedures in the EAR.' 2 4 Careful
attention to how the application is worded and processed through
various stages is important to reduce delays and possible "Returns
without Action" (RWAs), negative considerations, or restrictions on
one's ability to export.
Often it is wise to consult with OEA licensing officers before fil-
ing a particular application to determine the amount of information
necessary for review. For example, commodities generally should be
described in terms of quantity per type per model number. In the
case of disk drives for various types of personal computers, however,
119 EAR § 371.22(d).
120 EAR § 371.17.
121 EAR § 371.22.
122 EAR § 371.22(b)(1)-(6).
123 See EAR §§ 372.4, 374.3, 379.5, 379.8. See also EAR §§ 376.4 (special procedures
for servicing of equipment previously exported or re-exported to Country Groups 0, W,
and Y), 376.10 (special procedures for electronic computers and related equipment).
124 EAR § 386.
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the manufacturer may make the same type of drive for several differ-
ent PCs, and the model numbers will change with each new version.
In such a case, for an export license to authorize shipment of a vari-
ety of drives to a foreign distributor in a Free World country, OEA
licensing officers often will accept a designation by type of disk drive
(for example, Zeta-8) without requiring each part number to be spec-
ified. The descriptions must be specific enough to allow the product
to be evaluated, and greater specificity is required for the higher
technology exports. Significant technological changes, such as mov-
ing from double density to tri-density disk drives, will require license
amendments.
Documentary attachments are an important part of each license
application. Except for exports to T countries and certain specified
exceptions, the foreign end-user and purchaser generally must ob-
tain from its government or execute particular end-user documenta-
tion and provide it to the applicant before an export license
application may be filed.12 5 Exporters should request such docu-
ments early to allow sufficient time for processing the application.
Other documents describing the products and the transaction
often are helpful, especially for new products that may be unfamiliar
to OEA. Brochures are useful, but in sensitive cases marketing
materials that oversell the capabilities of a particular product may
cause difficulties. The statement that "this personal computer not
only helps Johnny do his homework faster, but is also used by NATO
to control nuclear battefield strategy" may sell more computers but
may not be so warmly received by Defense Department reviewers.
Applications to export or re-export computers must include the
computer's PDR.l2 6 Applications to export or re-export digital com-
puters to destinations in Country Groups Q W, Y, and the People's
Republic of China, or to upgrade existing digital computers in those
destinations, must include an executed Form 6031 P, Computer Sys-
tem Parameters. 12 7 Certain information specified in EAR section
376.10(a)(1) also must be supplied for such exports. If any of the
parameters fall within boxes "C" or "D" of Form 6031P, special
statements signed by the end user and the applicant must accompany
the application, and visitation requirements likely will be imposed if
the application is granted.' 28 Also, COCOM review of the latter ap-
plications is likely.
In addition to the documentation required by the regulations,
OEA licensing officers often ask for further information on certain
125 See EAR § 375 (documentation requirements and exceptions for particular com-
modities and destinations).
126 EAR § 399.1, Supp. No. 1, ECCN 1565A. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
127 EAR § 376.10(a)(1).
128 EAR § 376.10(a)(2), (3). See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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applications pursuant to their authority to request such information
as they deem necessary. 12 9 Certain information is requested so con-
sistently that regulations should be adopted so as not to penalize
new exporters and small businesses unaware of such "secret laws."
For instance, Swedish distributors of certain equipment must un-
dergo a clearance procedure through the U.S. embassy for OEA to
approve licenses authorizing them to resell in Sweden. Also, specific
information is consistently required in letters of explanation for
technical data applications3 ° generally, and specifically for training
foreign persons and for computer programs. Particular information
not listed in the EAR is required for "Parts and Components" appli-
cations.131 For up-to-date lists of the information required to be
submitted with such applications and others, exporters should con-
tact OEA directly.
Finally, exporters should include a stamped, self-addressed
postcard with each application so that OEA will notify them of the
case number assigned to their application. Although this is not men-
tioned in the regulations,' 3 2 it is nearly impossible to ascertain the
status of an application without the case number.
Processing times for export license applications vary depending
on whether an application requires referral to other agencies for re-
view and comment. Table 1 shows the general time limits. 133 Such
time limits are often not adhered to, unfortunately. While section
10(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 provided a right to
seek an injunction or other appropriate relief if the Commerce De-
partment exceeded such time limits,134 the Assistant General Coun-
sel of Commerce for International Trade has reinforced this author's
opinion that such actions are not helpful.' 3 5 Only one such action
appears to have been brought, and OEA denied the license applica-
tion and mooted the case.' 3 6 Exporters generally realize that reluc-
tantly acceding to delays beyond the time limits in hope that
arguments or compromises will overcome government objections is
preferable to resorting to pressure that likely will speed a denial.
Therefore, effective advocacy before OEA and the agencies to
whom an application is-referred is often crucial in processing sensi-
129 See EAR § 372.5.
130 See EAR § 379.5(d).
131 See EAR § 376.12. See alho supra note 93.
132 EAR § 370.13(b) states that OEA will notify applicants of the case number and
certain other processing information within ten days, but this requirement rarely is ad-
hered to. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. BULL. No. 222 at 2 (Aug. 9, 1982)
(recommending postcard).
133 See EAR § 370.13 (specific processing times).
'34 See EAR § 370.13(m) (procedures for administrative petition).
135 See Hunt, supra note 98, at 247.
136 Id. See Daedalus Enters., Inc. v. Baldridge, 563 F. Supp. 1345 (D.D.C. June 21,
1983) (order granting summary judgment for plaintiff and requiring compliance with sec-
tion 10 of the Export Administration Act).
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tive applications.' 3 7 It is important to discuss sensitive applications
with an OEA commodity specialist to ascertain the issues that should
be addressed, the other agencies that likely will review the applica-
tion, and the concerns of those agencies. Consultations with the re-
ferral agencies, as appropriate, also are useful to resolve questions
and shorten processing time.
C. Special Licensing Procedures
Because individual Validated Licenses are too awkward for most
high-volume exporters, the EAR contains special licensing proce-
dures that authorize multiple exports to specified consignees. i3 8
137 See generally Berlack, Practical Tips on Obtaining Export Licenses, in THE COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS, supra note 1, at 253.
138 EAR § 373. Special limitations apply to exports to South Africa or Namibia under
all such procedures. EAR § 373.1(a).
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The principal multiple licenses are the Distribution License and the
Service Supply License.' 39 An alternative worth considering is the
individual "bulk" license.
1. Distribution Licenses
The Distribution License (DL) is a multiple license that autho-
rizes exports under an international marketing program to consign-
ees/distributors that have been approved in advance by the Multiple
License Branch of OEA. t 40 Under certain conditions, re-exports to
authorized territories may be made under a DL. Although certain
commodities are excluded, the DL is an invaluable mechanism that,
after approval of a very detailed application, authorizes most exports
to be made without individual Validated Licenses to T and V Coun-
try Groups, except for Afghanistan and the People's Republic of
China.
Exporters using a DL must be particularly careful to observe the
commodity restrictions and to be certain that their consignees do so
for re-exports. As discussed earlier, many computers cannot be ex-
ported under the DL procedure to various countries if they have a
PDR exceeding one of the three applicable thresholds or if they are
nuclear-related or are being sent to nuclear end users.' 4 1 Similarly,
certain lasers and laser systems, certain spectrum analyzers applying
Fast Fourier techniques, multispectral image processing equipment,
and other specified commodities cannot be exported under a DL.142
Individual licenses are therefore necessary to supplement even the
most comprehensive DL.
At this writing, controversial proposed regulations 43 are likely
to be adopted in some form and should tighten the DL requirements
and procedures significantly. These proposals result from the belief
by some government officials that the flexibility of the DL system has
139 Others are the Project License, EAR § 373.2, the Qualified General License for
multiple exports to Q, W, and Y destinations of certain commodities to certain end-users
for certain approved end-uses, EAR § 373.4, and the Aircraft and Vessel Repair Station
Procedure, EAR § 373.8.
The Project License procedure should offer a good opportunity to combine several
applications that are necessary for one system sale due to different processing codes. See
EAR §§ 372.4(d), 373.2(a)(1). Experience indicates, however, that the Project License is
disliked by OEA licensing officers, and that it is often easier to submit a coordinated series
of export licenses for a turnkey project, for instance.
140 EAR § 373.3.
141 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
142 See EAR § 373, Supp. No. 1.
143 See 49 Fed. Reg. 35,790 (1984). These proposals revised earlier more draconian
changes that had been proposed but had received strong objections from industry. See 49
Fed. Reg. 2264 (1984); see also Export Rule Revisions Expected, J. Comm., Dec. 11, 1984, at
IA; Commerce Export Plan Attacked, J. Comm., Mar. 23, 1984, at IA, col. 6; Samuelson, How
We Harm OurAdvanced Indutries, Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 6; McKenzie, The
Commerce Department Proposes New Restrictions on Distribution Export Licenses, I COMPuTER LAW.
24 (Mar. 1984).
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been abused and is partly the cause of diversion of high technology
equipment to the Soviet Union. 144 Unfortunately, the proposed re-
strictions may limit the utility of the DL procedure, particularly for
small and emerging businesses. Exporters will have to exercise even
greater care than previously to ensure that their exports comply with
EAR requirements.
Significant facets of the proposed new regulations include:
(1) a detailed compliance program that must be adopted by licen-
sees and their consignees;
(2) audits of all licensees by OEA on an expected six to seven-year
basis;
(3) notifications to customers of U.S. jurisdiction over re-exports;
(4) customer approval by OEA for export of semiconductor manu-
facturing equipment and certain other exports;
(5) a minimum volume of sales to authorized re-export territories to
qualify;
(6) exclusion of additional commodities from eligibility for export
under a DL, including specialized computer processors with an
"equivalent multiply rate" over two million operations per sec-
ond and certain semiconductor manufacturing and testing
equipment; and
(7) significantly increased detail in applications and review
thereof. 145
OEA already has begun instituting the audit procedure in particular
by splitting its Multiple License Branch into two separate units, a
Licensing Unit and an Auditing Unit. More changes in this area can
be expected, and similar tightening efforts may be imposed on other
export licensing procedures after some experience with new DL
rules.
2. Service Supply License
The Service Supply License (SL) is a multiple license that, after
approval of a fairly detailed application, authorizes export of replace-
ment parts, as well as spares to some countries, and servicing of
equipment located abroad.' 46 The SL allows for prompt servicing
by a U.S. company or its foreign service facility.
An SL is especially useful for servicing expensive industrial
equipment exported G-DEST but having parts that require Validated
Licenses because General License GLR cannot be used to export re-
placement parts for such equipment. 147 It is also useful for servicing
of equipment located in Country Groups Q W, and Y, as well as
Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China, because the DL
procedure cannot be used for such countries. 148 Special restrictions
144 See supra note 143.
145 49 Fed. Reg. 35,790 (1984).
146 EAR § 373.7.
147 See EAR § 371.17.
148 Compare EAR § 373.3(a) with § 373.7(c).
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nevertheless apply to SL exports to those destinations, such as the
requirement that all exports be on a one-for-one replacement basis
with no authorization for spares.' 49 Thus, exporters of computer
equipment to those countries should include provisions for neces-
sary spare parts in their original individual Validated License
applications.
3. Individual "Bulk" Licenses
Individual licenses often can be obtained to authorize, for exam-
ple, a year's supply of exports of specified products, such as personal
computers, to a foreign distributor with up-front authorization to re-
sell within the country or to re-export to specified destinations. 150
Such licenses are known in the trade as "bulk" licenses, and they
often are useful to supplement special licensing procedures. For in-
stance, some personal computers are above the PDR limit of twenty
megabits per second and cannot be exported under a DL to South
Africa and other countries. 151 An individual bulk license often can
be obtained to allow such exports to a specified distributor in South
Africa.
Small businesses beginning to export frequently may use bulk
licenses when their volume of exports and sales territories do not yet
seem large enough to justify a DL. Exporters should try to consult
with OEA licensing officers before filing such applications for the
first time because there may be special requirements not mentioned
in the regulations, such as the Swedish clearance procedure dis-
cussed earlier. Also, exporters should investigate the laws in their
distributor's country because it is very difficult to terminate relations
with distributors in some countries even if they are unreliable. 52
D. Export Clearance Procedures
Finally, one of the more mundane aspects of export licensing is
one that nevertheless requires careful attention-the export clear-
ance procedures.' 53 Shipper's Export Declarations must be com-
pleted correctly and delivered to carriers,154 and destination control
statements and Validated License numbers and/or General License
symbols must be placed on invoices and shipping documents 55
prior to export. Such tasks should not be left to the discretion of an
149 EAR § 373.7(i). As with the DL, certain commodities are ineligible for export
under an SL. EAR § 373.7(b).
150 See EAR § 374.3(a).
151 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., Sales, Termination of Sales Agents and Distributors in France, 17 INT'L LAw. 741
(1983); Simons, Termination of Sales Agents and Distributors in Belgium, id. at 752.
153 EAR § 386.
154 EAR § 386.3; 15 C.F.R. § 30.50-.57 (1984) (exemptions).
155 EAR § 386.4, .5, .6.
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independent freight forwarder, at least not without careful review
and instructions. Often, detentions by Customs Inspectors result
from mistakes in such documentation, and knowledgeable persons at
this stage can serve as a check on a company's export licensing
system.
Exporters also must pay attention to the requirements of record-
ing shipments on the back of Validated Licenses and returning used
licenses to OEA.156 If the new auditing procedures in the DL area
are implemented in other areas, review of licenses returned or not
will be an obvious first step, especially given the increased use of
computers at OEA. Likewise, exporters should maintain records in
accordance with the various recordkeeping requirements of the
EAR,157 but they should maintain the records for at least the five-
year statute of limitations period as opposed to the two-year EAR
requirement. ' 58
IV. Compliance Programs
A. Reasons for Having a Compliance Program
It is increasingly vital for exporters to have programs of proce-
dures for compliance with U.S. export control laws. As indicated in
this article, the EAR and other export control regulations have be-
come exceedingly complex. Mistakes are bound to occur, and it is
important to minimize the risk of inadvertent violations. The recent
emphasis on enforcement activities and the institution of auditing
procedures make formal corporate compliance programs mandatory.
Moreover, a compliance program makes sense from the stand-
point of efficiency alone. U.S. export licensing delays can hamper
sales efforts, and therefore, it is important to coordinate export li-
cense applications and processing with marketing and sales efforts.
A coordinated program also can reduce customer relations and con-
tract problems that can arise because of export licensing delays. Es-
tablishing a chain of command to resolve export licensing issues can
assure appropriate responses to legal or policy problems, as can
proper adherence to recordkeeping requirements.
Every company that exports in any volume should establish a
company policy of legal compliance in all areas, and export licensing
is no exception. Setting forth such a policy in a program of which all
156 EAR § 386.2.
157 EAR § 387.13. See also EAR §§ 371.2(g) (general licenses); 371.22(f) (GTE);
372.6(c) (evidence of order); 373.3(1) (DL), 373.7(j) (SL); 374.7 (re-exports); 375.6 (origi-
nals); 386.3(e)(5) (agent's authority); 386.3(r) (summary monthly reports); 388.15 (request
to produce records).
158 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982) (criminal); 22 U.S.C. § 2462 (civil). The EAR provision
implies that five-year recordkeeping would be wise. EAR § 387.13(e)(1).
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affected personnel are aware helps to assure such legal compliance in
the least burdensome manner possible.
B. Personnel
Responsibility for obtaining export licenses and ensuring that all
exports are made legally should be centralized. Corporations with
many divisions can profit by having the parent company hold a Dis-
tribution License so that more exports can be made to various terri-
tories without cumbersome individual licenses. Small businesses
should have at least one person knowledgeable in export licensing,
preferably with backup. Similarly, overseas offices and distributors
should centralize responsibility for re-export compliance.
The personnel centrally responsible for export licensing must
have backing from top management officials. Such backing is neces-
sary not only to enable them to be effective, but Commerce Depart-
ment officials have indicated that their DL audits will be focusing on
the extent of involvement by top corporate management in export
compliance.
Companies should educate their sales force to export licensing
requirements so that delivery commitments can be coordinated with
the realities of export licensing. Also, salespersons should be aware
of the possibility of illegal diversion by United States as well as for-
eign customers and the potential for vicarious liability as a result. A
system for incorporating the Table of Denial Orders159 into a check-
list for exports is important to protect against illegal exports. On the
other end of the delivery chain, shipping departments should be
aware of export clearance procedures and should coordinate with
those responsible for obtaining the licenses.
Of course, these efforts should be coordinated with legal coun-
sel familiar with export licensing issues, both inside and outside the
corporation. In this way, policy issues and legal issues that arise can
be addressed promptly and accurately.
C. Contracting
Several contract terms are important for export control reasons.
First, contingency clauses should be inserted in any export sales con-
tract to avoid liability for licensing delays, restrictions imposed on
licenses, denials of licenses, and future regulatory actions inhibiting
delivery, servicing, warranty performance, and software updates.
Often a standard force majeure clause can be construed to cover
such U.S. Government actions beyond the exporter's control. In
sensitive cases in which licensing problems can be anticipated, how-
159 EAR § 388, Supp. No. I lists orders that deny export privileges in whole or in part
to various companies and individuals, both foreign and domestic. It is illegal to participate
in exporting activities with persons subject to denial orders. EAR § 387.12.
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ever, it is best to address the issue specifically, at the very least to
assure that both parties are on notice. Methods of resolving issues
arising from export licensing restrictions that limit the equipment
that may be exported also are recommended. Such direct contin-
gency clauses can be tempered with a "best efforts" clause obligating
the seller (and perhaps the buyer) to use its best efforts to obtain a
satisfactory export license.
Responsibility clauses that place export licensing responsibility
on the customer should be considered in domestic sales contracts for
especially sensitive equipment or technology or where the customer
intends to export it. Such clauses will not insulate a company from
liability if there is reason to know of an intended violation.160 Never-
theless, such an undertaking by a customer should help to avoid vica-
rious liability in most cases.
Written assurance provisions' 6' regarding re-export of technol-
ogy or the direct product thereof should be incorporated in all for-
eign licensing contracts as appropriate. Also, other export licensing
related contract provisions may be useful in specific cases.
D. Response to Issues and Problems
Prompt, careful, and informed responses to issues that arise in
export licensing are important to resolve problems quickly and con-
trol damages without creating additional problems. Often prompt
action can resolve a problem immediately that would take longer if
delays allowed a chain of administrative procedures to begin. Unin-
formed action, however, also can create more problems.
OEA will sometimes Return without Action (RWA) license appli-
cations, issue Negative Consideration Letters (NCLs) based on the
views of a reviewing agency, or deny an application entirely. Often
RWAs can be avoided by proper filing and homework on issues likely
to arise. Also, unavoidable NCLs or denials can at times be reversed
or successful compromises developed, pursuant to skillful presenta-
tions addressing legal, political, and technical issues.
As discussed earlier, prompt responses to detentions by Opera-
tions Exodus often can result in quick release of items legally ex-
ported. Petitions should be filed to mitigate penalties, establish a
record, and reduce the likelihood of an OEE compliance investiga-
tion. Investigations of such violations, even small ones, can mini-
mize similar problems in the future. OEE compliance investigations
should be coordinated with counsel to assure appropriate legal re-
sponses and minimize present and future risks.
Finally, all responses to export licensing issues should be timely
160 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
161 See EAR § 379.4(0 (GTDR).
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and cooperative. Although export licensing is considered a nuisance
by most exporters, most government officials in this area are willing
to be helpful in civil cases. Disclosures should be considered and
usually should be made, but only after careful consideration of the
legal issues involved.
V. Conclusion
Export licensing of computer equipment and technology has be-
come complex and cumbersome. The recent extension of Validated
License requirements to many types of software demonstrates that
the burdens likely will continue to increase rather than decrease.
New legislation, however, could provide some assistance in the Free
World area. Nevertheless, the underlying policies ensure that export
controls will continue to be dynamic and involve interesting debates.
